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lbere is much to argue about in the French Generation of 1820, but the arguments themselves 
can only be a source of pleasure and of a clearer understanding of Restoration France. 
* * * 
Robert B. Carlisle 
St. Lawrence University 
Mark J.Stem -Society and Family Strategy: Erie County, New York 1850-1920. Albany: State 
University of New York Press , 1987. Pp. xiv , 172. 
1be dramatic decline in childbearing in the United States between 1800 and 1920 represented 
a virtual revolution in human behaviour. In 1800 the yearly birth rate of white Americans stood at 
around 55 births per living American; it was halved by 1920. Mark Stem offers a unique, and com-
pactly written study of Erie county for the period after 1850. The study is unique in two respects . 
First, it is based on a very large nominal data set, using samples drawn from the federal census of 
1900 and the New York state censuses of 1855 and 1915 for Buffalo and Erie county. Second, the 
study takes the question of fertility decline as central to wider questions of changes in class structure, 
educational opportunity and family economy. 
The analysis is tightly organized into six chapters. The first reviews historical explanations 
of fertility decline in the U.S., and draws on the important recent European and international studies. 
A critical, but admiring view of Caldwell 's emphasis on the effects of mass education on fertility 
and family strategy informs Stem's core analysis. 
Chapter two reviews the county's economic and social structural changes from the mid 
nineteenth-century to 1920. A theoretically grounded class analysis is introduced, emphasizing the 
split between the old, entrepreneurial business class and the emerging white-collar stratum, and a 
parallel division between primary and secondary workers (skilled and unskilled), as well as ethnic 
divisions . The categorization of occupational data into class strata, rather than status ranks, is con-
vincing, but problems of classification and boundary drawing are not fully resolved, nor discussed 
(semi-professionals and government employees are included in the " old" propertied business class). 
A key to the subsequent analysis appears in aggregate evidence and 1918 cost-of-living data showing 
that after 1890, for the first time, local economic conditions provided a modestly secure standard 
of living for skilled labour. 
Chapter three traces differential fertility among specific occupational groups, larger class strata 
(old and new business and working classes) and among nativity and ethnic groups. Stem adopts the 
standardized child-woman ratio as a measure of fertility, with only the most abbreviated discussion 
of its limits. Fertility differentials are analysed for occupational, nativity and ethnic groups and in 
terms of the varying shapes of age-specific fertility curves for three census cross-sections. The latter 
leaves room for alternative interpretations. The general fertility transition of Erie county (and by 
inference of the U.S.) is revealed to be composed of a set of "mini-transitions" among occupational 
and ethnic populations. Each class stratum experienced declining fertility in different ways, with 
professional and business employees leading the way; skilled workers led the unskilled. Natives had 
lower fertility than immigrants and old immigrants lower than new. There is evidence that families 
controlled fertility first by birth spacing, later, by practicing family limitation. Stem might have 
indicated that, despite nominal data, the series of cross-sections do not trace individual women over 
time to detect the effects of class mobility, rather than class position, on fertility. 
With a strong emphasis on the leading role of changes in opportunity structures, Stem follows 
Joseph A. Bank's early study of Victorian England (Prosperity and Parenthood, London, 1954) 
suggesting that fertility declines were endangered by the emergence (not diffusion) of different, but 
parallel, middle-class cultures among the new salaried business class and among skilled workers. 
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The new emphasis on advancing the occupational prospects of children, especially through formal 
education, prompted differential, but progressive, fertility control. Inferences regarding changes in 
values and outlook invite complementary cultural histories. Although beyond his data, Stem fails 
to mention the potential significance of religion, as a mediating factor in the timing and differentials 
of fertility decline among class segments. 
Chapter four takes up the implications for fertility of mass school attendance. The thesis is 
boldly offered. "Education is the Grand Central Station of the fertility decline" (93). Patterns of 
high school attendance from 1850 to 1915 among occupational and ethnic groups are analysed (mass 
public school attendance was largely completed). Gender-specific high-school attendance patterns 
for the occupational and ethnic groups are considered in some detail, supplementing the data of 1900 
and 1915 with Federal Census data for Erie county in 1850, 1870 and 1880. 
Before 1900, school attendance increased especially rapidly among the new white-collar 
business class. Only after 1900 did working-class families send much larger numbers of children 
to high school. Stem attributes considerable importance to the difference between the increased 
attendance of the children of skilled and unskilled workers, but the data could be interpreted more 
cautiously (103 and table 4.2). The class differences among boys were more striking than among 
girls and the native-born consistently had higher attendance than immigrants. Those of German 
ancestry, however, had surprisingly low attendance. Stem avers that the German community was 
able to continue to promote informal recruitment for sons to skilled work, blunting the value of formal 
education. 
The central issue of education and fertility is presented in a brief section. In 1900 and 1915, 
the new business class had the lowest average fertility and highest attendance, followed in order by 
the old business class, skilled workers and the unskilled. At the individual level, for all occupational 
groups, estimated completed fertility is inversely related to teenaged childrens' school attendance, 
as expected. The data present some puzzles, however. The associations are much weakened in 
multivariate analysis and the complications not fully unravelled. Moreover, as Stem makes clear, 
the cross-sectional data for 1900 are too early to reflect the expected transformation for the working 
class. 
If the analysis persuasively places the class experience at the core of the American fertility 
decline, it is rather less clear how the effect of education should be interpreted. In the end, this lack 
of clarity is mainly a matter of inconsistency in emphasis. In these data, rising school attendance 
seems to be a response to the same forces that led to reduced fertility - the rise in working-class 
standards of living and opportunities for occupational mobility among skilled workers and the new 
business class. Thus, increased education, like lowered fertility itself, is as much a consequence of 
altered family strategies in the face of new class experiences as a ''switching station'' (3) or prior 
condition influencing parent's childbearing (113), as it appears in, say, Caldwell's work ("Mass 
Education as a Determinant of the Timing of Fertility Decline,'' Population and Developement 
Review, 6:2 (June, 1980), 225-55). The complexity of these mutual influences warrants precision. 
The interpretation raises a further cultural, perhaps, socio-psychological, question. How do 
we account for the quite sudden recognition by working-class parents after 1900 that their circum-
stances had changed decisively and predictably enough to warrant a dramatic transformation in family 
strategies and in matters as intimate and consequential as childbearing? 
Chapter 5 provides a comparison of farm and urban fertility differentials and class variations 
within each sector. It is a unique comparative contribution, but seems the most strained. The 
(unreported) age distribution of tenants is taken to indicate that Erie county had a permanent tenant 
population ( 119). The higher fertility ratio of tenants than farm owners is taken as evidence of the 
formers' greater responsiveness to immediate economic circumstances. I find the evidence ambiguous 
and implications unclear. Stem does find general support for the "land availability" thesis, reduced 
fertility in the face of restricted land markets, but exempts the higher fertility German-born on cultural 
grounds, reversing the book's general emphasis on the preeminence of structural over cultural 
conditions. 
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In the final chapter, a review broadens into a wide ranging interpretation of class structure 
and ethnic accommodation in American society. Most interestingly, it places the remarkable decline 
of fertility in the U.S. and its class differentials at the centre of the changes that deeply incorporated 
the American worl<ing class into the cultural forms and family commitments of American capitalism. 
Stern suggests, in effect, the decline of fertility among white-collar workers and among the skilled 
aristocraty of American labour reflected the emergence of a version of Stedman-Jones ''culture of 
consolation" in England (75), presumably replacing the community and potential for conflict of the 
earlier worl<ing class with the more individualist accommodations of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
1bis is an interesting, readable and tightly-written book that contributes significant empirical 
evidence and theoretical argument to the study of the decline in fertility; it offers, moreover, inter-
pretations that are intended to and should draw demographic history into wider debates about class 
formation and forms of class action in the making of modern American capitalism. 
* * * 
Gordon Darroch 
York University 
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To write an economic and social history of Europe for the last century is an ambitious 
undertaking. Yet Tipton and Aldrich attempt more: they cover the political and military history of 
Europe as well, and they seek to deal with all the European countries, except the dwarf states like 
Liechtenstein and Malta. Moreover, as the bookjacket puts it, they "further examine Europe's impact 
on Africa, Asia and America, particularly through trade and decolonization.'' This task is addressed 
in volumes which together contain a quarter of a million words of text, four maps, about 159 references 
and an index. 
Volume I has a symmetric structure. The first four chapters deal with European economic 
development, Europe and the international economy, European society, and European politics and 
ideology, all prior to 1914. Then, after a chapter on World War I, the next four chapters repeat the 
themes of the first chapters, but for the inter-war period. The volume ends with a brief epilogue on 
the Spanish Civil War and World War II. Volume II starts with a chapter on World War II, and two 
chapters on post-war reconstruction, the first focussing on Europe, the second on the international 
economy. The four following chapters cover the period 1950-70 and repeat the themes of the first 
four chapters in volume I. Chapter 8 deals with the so-called continuing crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, 
and the volume ends with an epilogue on World War III. 
The overall organization is thus thematic rather than national, somewhat along the lines of 
volume V of Carlo Cipolla's Economic History of Europe. However, within this overall approach, 
nearly half the chapters have a micro-level structure which successively deals with individual countries 
or groups of countries, such as Scandinavia, Eastern or Southern Europe. This framework has the 
advantage of permitting a self-contained discussion on a given theme over a given period. A topic 
well suited to such treatment is decolonization after World War II. But the framework has attendant 
disadvantages: where themes overlap, there will be repetition; the chronology of events and policies 
will be difficult to follow; and a coherent presentation of the formulation and execution of government 
poli~ies at the national or sub-national level is likely to be impossible. Clio is not likely to flourish 
under these disabilities; and indeed, Tipton and Aldrich celebrate their approach as a succession of 
epochs, rather than a dynamic flow of change. 
